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Abstract
A new aerospace applicationof structuralreliability
techniquesispresented,where the appliedforcesdepend
on many probabilisticvariables.This applicationisthe
plume impingement loadingof the Space Station Free-
dom Photovoltaic Arrays. When the space shuttle
berths with Space Station Freedom itmust brake and
maneuver towards the berthing point using itsprimary
jets. The jet exhaust, or plume, may cause high loads
on the photovoltaicarrays. The many parameters gov-
erning this problem are highly uncertain and random.
An appl_oach, using techniques from structural reliabil-
ity, as opposed to the accepted deterministic methods,
is presented which assesses the probability of failure of
the array mast due to plume impingement loading. A
Monte Carlo simulation of the berthing approach is used
to determine the probability distribution of the loading.
A probability distribution is also determined for the
strength of the array. Structural reliability techniques
are then used to assess the array mast design. These
techniques are found to be superior to the standard
deterministic dynamic transient analysis, for this class
of problem. The results show that the probability of
failure of the current array mast design, during its
15 year life, is minute.
Introduction
There existsa class of civilstructureswhich have a
wide variety of Uncertain loadings and are difficulto
testat a system level,but must stillpossessa long life
with minimal riskof failure. At the same time, these
structuresmust not be excessivelyexpensive or weighty.
Because of the random characterof the uncertaintiesin
both the loading and the capabilityof thesestructures,
a probabilisticapproach to design iswarranted. The
probabilisticdisciplineof structuralreliabilityhas been
developed in order to ensure safetyand consistencyin
structuraldesigns and in the civilengineering design
codes.1"2Recently,structuralreliabilitytechniqueshave
alsobeen appliedto aerospaceengineeringcomponents,
such as the turbopump blades ofthe space shuttlemain
engine.3"5 Here, the random variablesof concern have
focusedon the constitutiverelationshipsand properties
ofthe structure.In thisstudy,a new aerospace applica-
tion of structural reliability techniques is presented,
where the applied forces as well as the structure depend
on many probabilistic variables. This application is the
plume impingement loading of the Space Station Free-
dom Photovoltaic Arrays.
When the space shuttle approaches Space Station
Freedom itmust brake and maneuver to come toa com-
pletestop relativeto Space Station Freedom. This is
achieved through the use of the shuttle'sprimary reac-
tioncontrolsystem (PRCS) jets,each of which delivers
about 800 Ib of force. The plume from these jets
expands quickly in space so that a low density plume
impinges upon the photovoltaic (PV) arrays (Fig.1).
However, sincethe area of the photovoltaicarraysisso
large(110 ftby 39 ft,Fig. 2),thesmall plume forcescan
cause significantloading in the photovoltaicarray. Of
particulaxconcern isthe bending moment at the base of
the mast, which can be very largebecause ofthe mast's
long length.
Calculating the exact transient loads which result
from plume impingement forcing is quite difficult
because of the many random variables which govern the
analysis. These random variables are the shuttle posi-
tion, the shuttle orientation, the space station orienta-
tion, space station thermal deformation, photovoltaic
array mast twist, feathered angle accuracy, predicted
plume forces accuracy, the dynamics excited by a partic-
ular approach to Space Station Freedom (essentially
dynamic load factor), modeling uncertainty, and the
array mast strength uncertainty. Most of these vari-
ables define the geometric orientation of the space
shuttle with respect to Space Station Freedom and,
therefore, define the amount of plume exhaust impinging
upon the arrays.
Alloftheserandom variablesare independent and it
ishighly unlikely that all of their worst case values
would coincidein time. Nonetheless,a setof transient
dynamic analysesaxe currentlyperformed, using forcing
functionswhich areselectedin an attempt to bound the
worst possibleapplied forces. The resultinginternal
loads are compared to the limitload capabilityof the
structure.Results from the referencedwork indicates
that at the permanently manned configuration(PMC,
Fig. 1), the bending moment applied to photovoltaic
array mast exceeds the limit load by 10 percent. This
attempt to bound the worst possible loading has been
made the baseline for structural design.
This study demonstrates the use of structural
reliability techniques to compute the probability of
failure of the array masts, with loading governed by
random inputs and an uncertain structural capability.
The probability of failure during a single shuttle berth-
ing approach to PMC and during the lifetime of the
arrays will be presented. This work will be important in
deciding whether or not the worst came deterministic
transient mxalysis discussed above is appropriate. This
work lays the foundatioms for a plume impingement
analysis methodology that is probability based and one
that produces a realistic, stud still reasonably conserva-
tive, loads assessment. A cost analysis based on the
probability of f_lure is also presented.
Although plume impingement loading is a concern
for the entire space station, this study focuses on the
bending moment in the PV array masts. In particular,
the arrays on the port side (Fig. 1) are emphasized
because they are the most heavily loaded. The method-
ology developed is useful for these arrays, and for all
plume impingement loads analyses and stage configura-
tions of the space station.
Theoretical Overview
Two methods of performing probabilityanalysisare
presented. The f'matis conventional Monte Carlo
simulationwhich produces a probabilitydistributionfor
an output,bmmd upon statisticaltrialsof a sequence of
random vectors. This method is easilyimplemented,
unfortunately,itrequiresa largenumbdr ofsimulations
toaccuratelypredicttheoutput probabilitydistribution.
The second method presented is a first-ordersecond-
moment scheme introduced by Hasofer and Lind.s This
method usesthe probabilitydistributionsof the random
variablesin the limit state function to produce the
probabilityof failure. In addition to the probability
subjectspresented,system reliabilityand cost analysis
are brieflydiscussed.
distributionfor the output can be accuratelydefined.
This method has grown increasinglypopular in recent
yearswith the advances incomputational speed,but the
number of simulations required to build an accurate
distributionof the output can be very large. In addi-
tion,any change to any of the input variablesrequires
that the entireanalysisbe redone. The benefitof the
method isitssimplicity.
For the case of using Monte Carlo simulation to
determine the probabilityofan output failing,a failure
functionmust be defined.Comfider the limitstateIfail-
ure} function,g ---R - S where R isthe resistance
(strength)and S isthe load. Then, if g < 0 (S > R)
the output failsand if g > 0 (S < R) the output sur-
vives. The limitstatefunction g has a binomial distri-
bution and the number of failuresdivided by the total
simulationsisthe probabilityof failure,or more gener-
ally,
P, = ft[g(x)]f(x) dx. (E g,)/N (')
where I[g(x)]isan indicatorfunction such that I = 1
if g < 0 and I-- 0if g_> 0, f(x)is the probability
densityofthe inputs,and N isthe number of simula-
tions.As indicatedabove, thismethod iseasy toimple-
ment, but the number of simulationsrequired can be
very large. This isespeciallytrue ifthe probabilityof
failureislow, sincevery few of the simulationswillbe
failures.The approximate variance on Pf in Eq. (1)is
given by
Var[Pl. ] = Pt, actual(1- Pl.actua.l)IN (2)
To properlydefinea probabilityof Pf willtake atleast
four ordersof magnitude more simulations than 1/Pf
in order to achieve a coefficientof variationlessthan
1 percent. Therefore, for Pf = 10 -3 (,-,$u), 10 7 simula-
tions axe needed to get the coefficient of variation of Pf
to less than 1percent. Note that Eq. (2) is not a
practical formula since Pf, actual is not known.
First-OrderSecond-Moment Methods
Monte Carlo Simulation
Monte Carlo simulation is based upon running many
simulations of a system with random variable inputs
and determining the distribution or probability of an
output, t In the case of building a distribution for an
output, each of the input variables is varied randomly
according to itsprobabilitydistributionfunction and
input into the simulation. The random output isthen
recorded. This processisrepeated many times untila
These methods arecalledf'mat-ordermethods because
they use the first-orderterm of a Taylor's seriesexpan-
sion to approximate the mean and the standard devia-
tion Isecondmoment) ofthe limitstatefunction. They
differfrom the Monte Carlo approaches in that each
variablewithin the limit statefunction isrepresented
only by itsdistribution,mean, and standard deviation.
The distributionsof random variables are utilisedto
yield the probability of failure. The Hasofer-Lind
method 6 gives,with respectto the limitstatefunction,
2
an invariant def'mition of the safety index and the
probability of failure. In the Hasofer-Lind method, each
variable is transformed to a reduced coordinate with a
zero mean and unit variance. The safety index becomes
the minimum distance from the origin to the limit state
in the space of reduced coordinates. A detailed descrip-
tion of this method is beyond the scope of this paper
and is contained in several excellent references. 1'_'6 In
general, the solution to this problem must be found
using a computer program. In this study, the algorithm
presented by Rackwits and Fiessler is used. ¢
The limitationof this method isin the use of only
the firstand second moments. This method isexact if
the distributionof the limitstatefunction isGaussian
sincea Gaussian distributioncan be completelyspecified
by its mean and variance. Ifthe distributionof the
limitstatefunctionisnot Gaussian, then othermoments
axe required to completely specifythe distribution.In
thiscase,second moment methods provideonly approxi-
mations to the probabilityoffailure.
System Reliability
Practical engineering problems almost always have
more than one failure mode. Each failure mode may be
represented by a particular limit state function and,
therefore, have a particular probability of failure, Pfr
Each of these component probabilities must be combined
to yield a system probability of failure, s For a system
which is represented as a series, failure of any compo-
nent is considered to be a failure of the entire system.
When a series system has no correlation between the
failure modes, the system probability of failure 1 is given
by
Pf = 1 - II (1 - Pfi) (3)
When a seriesystem has correlationinitsmodes offail-
ure, itsprobabilityof failureislower. Therefore, the
above equation representsan upper bound on the prob-
abilityoffailureand isconservative.
Cost Analysis
Once the probability of failure is defined, cost
analysis may be performed to optimize a design. Cost
may be defined in many ways. However, the total cost,
C T is the most logical. Total cost should encompass
initial costs, CI, and the cost of failure, C F. Initial costs
include design, manufacturing, and construction costs.
The cost of failure can be more difficult to define or
even nebulous if loss of life or status are considered.
However, a cost must be associated with each conse-
quence of a failure.Given C I sad C g
of a design isgiven by,
C T = C I + Pf * C F
the totalcost
(4)
Note that C F ismultipliedby the probabilityoffailure
to account for the factthat C F may never be required.
The optimum design is found by minimising C T-
The curve of C T will always be concave up if an in-
crease in C I causes a decrease in PC Therefore a mini-
mum will exist.
Methodology
Because of the complicated laws of physics governing
jet exhaust in a vacuum, it was not practical to include
the necessary equations of the problem physics in the
limit state functions. Therefore, the conventional Monte
Carlo approach was chosen to create the applied plume
load distributions (denoted by S). Distribution func-
tions of the photovoltaic array strength, and uncertainty
factors for plume physics and array dynamics were also
derived (denoted by R and U, respectively). This
problem has multiple failure modes and limit state
functions. To avoid repeating the large number of cal-
culations required in Monte Carlo analysis for each fail-
ure mode, the Hasofer-Lind second-moment method was
used to calculate the probability of failure from the load
and strength distributions. The form of the nonnormal-
ized limit state function used in this analysis was
g = Rmaat - Uplume * Udynamic (5)
• (Snomina 1 q- Sbrea]kout)
A descriptionof how the mean and variance of the
variablesin Eq. (5)were determined follows.
Monte Carlo Calculationof Loads Distribution
Previous loads analyses indicate that the port
inboard arrays are the ones criticallyloaded by plume
impingement. Therefore,thisstudy willfocus on these
two arrays: PIU (port inboard upper} and PIL (port
inboard lower} (Fig.1). These arrays axe in their
optimal feathering position,which is defined as the
location of the a and _ joints that minimize the
plume impingement loads.Figure Ishows the arraysin
theirfeatheredorientations.
Two different shuttle maneuvers were considered
independently: the nominal approach and the NormZ
breakout.Thenominalapproach is a series of different
jet firings as the shuttle brakes and maneuvers towards
the berthing point. Most of the firings are attitude
adjustments, but the Z-braking (not to be confused
with the NormZ breakout maneuver) and Y-burn
sideways firings are frequent and impinge greatly on the
PV arrays. Therefore, only these two firings were con-
sidered to contribute to the loading of the arrays during
a nominal approach.
The second maneuver of importance is the NormZ
breakout, which is a long duration NormZ f'wing used to
generate an opening velocity between the shuttle and
Space Station Freedom during an abort of the approach.
This maneuver is restricted to the last 75 ft of the
approach.
Now consider the distributions of the input variables
beginning with shuttle position and orientation with
respect to Space Station Freedom. During a nominal
approach, the Z-braking jets can only be fired within
75 ft of the space station and the Y-burn has little
impact outside this distance, so the distribution of
shuttle distance away from Space Station Freedom is
assumed such that 99.9 percent of the firings take place
within 75 ft of the space station. Even though the Z-
braking jets are not supposed to be used outside 75 ft,
there is a possibility they will be fired so this 0.1 percent
chance is held open by the distribution. The shape of
the distribution is detrmed by the braking profile. If the
shuttle pilots braked at a constant rate then the proba-
bility of being at a certain position would grow linearly,
with more time spent nearer the space station, but
because the pilots tend to brake more towards the end,
an exponential curve was used (Fig. 3). Because of the
faster speeds at 75 ft, the shuttle is less likely to be there
than at 10 ft. The distance the shuttle is away from the
space station is one random variable input.
A NormZ breakout can only occur within the final
75 ft, but again the possibility is left open that one will
be performed outside this range. However, unlike the
nominal approach, it is also assumed that the pilots may
get into trouble outside 75 ft and hold until 75 ft in
order to perform the high authority NormZ breakout.
Therefore a spike is placed on the breakout distance
distribution (Fig. 4) such that 10 percent of the break-
outs occur at 75 ft.
As the shuttle approaches the berthing point it
should remain within a 10 ° half angle cone originating
from the berthing point and expanding along the line of
approach. The shuttle is uniformly likely to be any-
where within this cone, and it is assumed that there is
a 5 percent chance that the pilots will exceed the limits
of the cone and that the likelihood of being a distance
outside the cone decreases linearly to zero (Fig. 5). For
the nominal approach, one other restrictionisapplied:
Only the port halfof the cone isused sincethe shuttle
willonly firetowards the port side ifitison the port
side. The position of the shuttlewithin the cone of
operationsistwo random variables:Distance from the
cone centerlineand the angle on the cone.
The shuttle orientation is maintained by a digital
autopilot which has _2 ° deadband, which means that
the shuttle can temporarily reach maximum rotations
larger than ±2 e. It is assumed that the distribution of
shuttle orientation about any of its three axes is normal
and that the deadband is at 2_r on a normal distribu-
tion (Fig. 6). With this distribution, there is a 0.1 per-
cent chance that the shuttle will exceed q-S ° of rotation.
The orientation of the shuttle with respect to Space
Station Freedom is three random variables: X, Y, and
Z shuttle rotations.
The space stationorientationismaintained by an
automatic controlsystem ofcontrolmoment gyros with
backup by a reactioncontrolsystem. Since the control
authority of these are low, itis not clear that Space
Station Freedom can remain within its deadbands of
q-Is. Therefore, the deadband isconsideredto be the
l_r positionon a normal distribution(Fig.7). This
makes the distributionof the three space stationaxes
identicalto that ofthe shuttle{Fig.6). The orientation
of the space stationisthree random variables: X, Y,
and Z space stationrotations.
As the space stationorbitsthe Earth itundergoes
thermal deformations as differentsides ace lighted.
Early indicationsare that the deformation may be as
large as "4-5° from the center to the end of the truss.
This isthe maximum about each axis. The likelihood
of a particulardeformation isgiven by a normal distri-
bution with 5a as the $# deviation (Fig.8). The ther-
mal deformation ofSpace StationFreedom isthreeran-
dom variables: X, Y, and Z space station truss
distortions.
Also consideredisthe design toleranceon the array
mast tiptwist.Specificationstatethat thismay be up
to 3°. This twistisassumed to be normally distributed
about the perfectdesignwith Se being the 3a deviation
(Fig.9). The mast tiptwist isone random variable.
There isapproximately 30 percent9 uncertaintyin
the currentequationsI0 used to derive plume impinge-
ment forces.To includethisuncertaintyinthe analysis,
anotherrandom variablerepresentingthisuncertaintyis
multipliedto the dynamic results.This factorismod-
eled as being normally distributedabout 1.0 with a
standard deviation of 0.1 (Fig.10). In this way the
plume physicsistreatedas one random variable.
As mentioned earlier,the PV arrays are being
featheredto minimise plume impingement loads. How-
ever,thisisnot dynamic feathering,so one positionfor
the a and _ jointshas been found and these angles
are held during the entire approach. There is some
uncertaintyin theseanglesdue to many factors,among
which are the possiblejoint locking locations,uncer-
tainty about the on-orbit position of the joints,and
dynamic twisting.Therefore,the featheranglescannot
be guaranteed to be perfect, so a distributionis
assumed. The designerssuggestthat the 3¢ values are
+4 ° for the a joint and +3 ° for the /_ joint. The
normal distributionsused forthe a and _ jointangles
areshown in Figs.11 to 13 about theirfeatherpositions
(shown in Fig. 1). The featherangle uncertaintiesare
two input random variables: a and _ rotations.
The dynamics of the arrays are the most difficultof
allthe random variablesto quantify. Ideally,a large
database ofshuttleapproach firingscouldbe used torun
dynamic response aspartofthe simulationprocess,how-
ever, lacking a database of shuttle approaches, some
assumptions needed to be made about the firingtime
historiesand their associated dynamic load factors
(DLF's). An estimate was made ofwhat the 3¢ DLF
isfor each firing.From the data,an estimate was also
made forthe varianceof the S¢ firingabout the expect-
ed value. The numbers axe differentfor each of the
arrays and are shown inFigs. 14 to 16. For the nominal
approach, the dynamic response isdominated by the
Y-burns, so much so that the Y-burn isthe only firing
that effectsthe PIU array. Because of this,on the PIU
array the DLF due to the Y-burns isshown in Fig. 14
and the DLF on the Z-braking firingsiszero. On the
PIL array,much ofthe load isdue tothe forcesactually
impinging upon the PIU array and dynamic coupling.
Because of this,the DLF for the Y-burn on the PIL
array (Fig.15) isapplied to the Y-burn forceson the
PIU array. The DLF due to the Z-braking firings
(Fig.16) isappliedto the Z-braking fu'ingson the PIL
array itself.Array dynamics are two input random
variables:Y-DLF and Z-DLF.
For the NormZ breakout the DLF's change to those
shown in Figs. 17 and 18. In this case, the bulk of
the plume impinges upon the PIL array and because of
dynamic coupling,the DLF's are both applied to the
forceson the PIL array.
The finiteelement model used to generate the dy-
namic response and the DLF's has an uncertaintyasso-
ciated with it. This uncertainty is estimated to be
_-20 percent. This modeled as a normally distributed
random variable with a mean of 1.0 and a standard
deviation of0.0(_67(Fig.19).
Photovoltaic Array Strength D!stri_ution
The Space Station Freedom Photovoltaic Array
consistsof four major elements, which are shown in
Fig.2. The firstisa center deployabletruss or mast,
the primary load bearing element of the system. Next,
there is a canister where the mast is stored during
launch. Italsoprovides a transitionstructureon orbit.
Third are the blankets upon which solar cells are
mounted. The finalcomponent is the blanket boxes
which protectthe blanketsduring launch. The blanket
boxes are mounted off of the top of the mast and the
canister,and once deployed, support the tensioned
blankets. Itisthe tensionwhich suppliesthe structural
bending stiffnessto the blankets. The dynamics ofthis
configurationhave been studiedin detail.11
The element of the photovoltaicarray which isthe
most criticalfor loads isthe mast. The cause of this
criticalityisthe mast's long length. Even a small load
appliedonto the blanketsistransferred,through the top
blanket boxes, onto the top of the mast. This small
force causes a large moment at the base of the mast.
The mast itselfis a foldingtrusswith four longerons
(Fig.20). There axe battens and other components
which hold the longerons together. Because of its
deployability,there axe additionalcomponents which
make the mast a complicated structure,as isillustrated
in Fig. 21.
Despite the factthat the array mast iscomplex, its
primary failuremechanism isclassicalEuler buckling of
the longeron,12 as isshown inFig.22. When the entire
mast is placed into bending about its neutral axis, the
moment forces longerons into compression and tension
(Fig. 23). When the bending is in a plane 45 ° from the
face of the mast, then, in each bay, two longerons axe in
the neutral plane, one is in tension, and one is in
compression. If the compression load due to bending
exceeds the Euler buckling load, Per, that longeron will
then buckle. It is the buckling of the longerons in
compression that defines the design limit load of the
entire mast. The plane 45 ° from the face is weakest
plane of the mast. For bending in the plane of the face
of the mast, the mast is q_'times stronger. The reason
for this is that there are two longerons taking load in
compression while the distance from the neutral axis to
the longerons is reduced by q_.
Any longeron in compression throughout the entire
length of the mast may fall,but the applied load is
greatestat the base and decreasesin each bay up the
length of the mast. The probabilityof failuremust be
calculatedfor each longeron. These failuremodes axe
independent and so the mast may be represented as a
series system. The overall probability of failure is then
calculated using Eq. (3).
It should be noted that failure modes other than
longeron buckling exist in the photovoltaic array mast.
These failure modes were not considered at this time.
The required design information to analyze these failure
modes in detail was not available. It is known, however,
that these failure modes have higher critical loads than
the critical load for longeron buckling.
When a single longeron buckles the entire system
does not fail catastrophically. For example, it takes two
longerons to fail in any bay for catastrophic failure to
occur. When considering that the longeron strength is
a random variable, the probability of this mode of fail-
ure will be much lower than that of one longeron buck-
ling. Even though it is not a catastrophic failure, one
longeron buckling was still considered to be system fail-
ure. The reason for this definition is that if one
longeron fails the array may not be able to be re-stowed
for on-orbit replacement. This would drastically compli-
cate EVA operations, and would have mission success
and safety implications. Therefore, because this defini-
tion is conservative and consistent with the Space
Station Freedom program specifications, one longeron
buckling was defined as system failure and the mast
becomes, in effect, a series system.
The distribution of the array strength is assumed to
be log-normal, although no fabrication data is available
at this time to confu'm this selection. However, this
assumption is consistent with structures whose members
are inspected. 1 Discarding the obviously defective
members truncates the left hand tail of the strength dis-
tribution. In the case of the photovoltalc array, the log-
normal distribution is especially appropriate because of
the extensive inspections and testing which will be per-
formed on mast components. The mean strength is as-
sumed to be the calculated buckling load multiplied by
an empirical knockdown factor. The variance was calcu-
lated by assuming that the project defined safety factors
bound the 3¢ standard deviation mast strength and
using the definitions of the log-normal probability
distribution. 13 It is worth noting that the empirical
factors used in the aerospace industry to define a struc-
tural design limit load14are roughly equivalent to the
-3_ strength based on a probability distribution.
Results
Load Distribution
The nominal and NormZ breakout load distributions
were computed separately based on 100,000 Monte Carlo
simulations.The resultingdistributionsofthe weak axis
moments are shown in Figs.24 to 27. In these figures,
the data pointsarethe resultsofthe simulationsand the
curves are the distributionsused to model the data.
These parameters of the distributionsare detailed in
Table 1. The type of distributionwas determined by
plottingthe resultson normal and log-normal distribu-
tion paper. The breakout maneuvers produced log-
normal distributionsand surprisinglythe rightsidesof
the nominal approach produced normal distributions.
The distributionschosen for the nominal approach
only match the rightsideofthe data because of the odd
shape of the data. This odd shape isdue to the fact
that at about 20 ftout, the shuttleisedge on to the
PIU array. Therefore,there are many pointsat which
the Y-burn loads on the array are near zero. Insideof
20 ft,the Y-burn plumes one face of the arrays and
outsideof20 ftthe Y-burn plumes the other face.This
crossovereffectmakes itimpossibletomatch a standard
distributionto the results. However, thisshould not
effectthe resultssignificantlysincethe rightsideofthe
curve will dominate the probabilityof failureanalysis
and thissideof the curve matches the data well.
Strength Distribution
Three mast designswere considered,each of which
representsthree discretedesigns of the Space Station
Freedom Photovoltaic Array. The design limit loads
of the three masts analyzed were 8300, 30,700, and
48,500 in.-Ib.The calculatedmeans and coefficientsof
variationfor thesethreemasts are shown inTable 2. A
plot of the strength distributionof the 48,500 in.-Ib
mast is shown in Fig.28. This is the current space
stationphotovoltaicarray mast design. The PIU and
the PIL mast were given the same distribution.
Probabilityof Failureand System Reliability
The probability of failure of each longeron in both
the PIU and the PIL photovoltaic arrays was calculated.
For the two specific cases of the bottom longerons of the
30,700 in.-lb PIL and PIU arrays, the design points, var-
iable sensitivity, and probability of failures are shown in
Tables $ and 4. The probability that any longeron, in
either the PIU mast or the PIL mast would fail, was cal-
culated using Eq. (3). As discussed previously, this
equation is applicable when there is no correlation in the
strength of the longerons. Since there is almost certainly
some correlation in the strength of the longeron mem-
bers, using Eq. (3) is conservative. At this time, no
correlation data is available, and so a conservative
approach is warranted.
0
Theprobabilityoffailureof eitherarraymastover
theentirelifeof SpaceStationFreedomwasalsocom-
puted.It wasassumed that a breakout would occur on
every approach, which is likely very conservative, but no
data exists upon which to make a better assumption.
The total number of approaches to Space Station
Freedom over its entire life will be about 120. The
lifetime probability is given by,
Pf 1 - (1 P _x2o= -- f,event/ (6)
Table 5 summarizes the system probabilitiesof failure
calculated. The probabilityof failureranges from an
almost certaintyin the case of the 8300 in.-Ibarray to
almost zero in the case of the 48,500 in.-Ibarray,the
current design. The exact numerical values for Pf,
given inTable 5,are not accuratewhen thesevaluesare
extremely small. There axe two reasonsfor thisinaccu-
racy. First,an insufficientnumber of Monte Carlo sim-
ulationswere performed to accuratelydefinethe load
distributionin the extreme tailregion (as noted by
Eq. (2)). Secondly, the Hasofer-Lind method with the
Rackwitz-Fiessler algorithm is not accurate in the
extreme tailregions."In spiteof this,thesevalues are
so low, in the case of the currentdesign,that an exact
value for Pf isnot relevant. As discussedin previous
sections,many uncertaintiesremain in these analyses.
However, where an uncertaintyexisted,a conservative
assumption or parameter value was used. Therefore,
photovoltaicarray mast failuredue to plume impinge-
ment, with the currentdesign,ishighly unlikely.
As a comparison, deterministicanalyseshave shown
that an array mast of33,000 in.-Ibwould be requiredto
insureno photovoltaic array mast failures.Yet, this
work shows that the probability of failureof the
30,700 in.-Ibmast isapproximately 0.0012 percent. A
failureof a 33 000 in.-Ibmast would requireapproxi-
mately a 4.2¢ event. Therefore, the deterministic
transient analysis, with bounding worst case force
assumptions, does not give a clearpictureof the risk
involved with theseparticulardesigns.
SensitivityAnalysis
A result available from the Rackwitz and Fiessler
algorithm is the sensitivity (a) of the design point, and
hence the probability of failure, to the random variables.
A high a indicates that the variable is important to
the design point while a low a indicates that the vari-
able is not important in the probability of failure.
In this analysis there were five random variables
used in the Rackwitz and Fiessleralgorithm (Eq. (5}):
Nominal plume loaA, NormZ breakout plume load,
plume physics uncertainty,modeling uncertainty,and
PV array strength. Tables 3 and 4 show the sensitivity
ofthe probabilityoffailureofthe 30 700 in.-IbPIU and
PIL arrays to these random variables. As we would
expect,the array strengthisalways important. On the
load side,note that the PIL array isdominated by the
NormZ breakout load. On the PIU array there isno
clearlydominant variablebut the nominal load isthe
most important and the model uncertaintyfactoristhe
leastimportant. These sensitivityresultssuggest that
effortand money should bespent increasingthe strength
or reducing the loads and not reducing the uncertainty
factors.
Cost Analysis
The values cited here are relativeand are shown
more to illustratethe techniquesinvolved incostanaly-
sis,rather than to present preciseprojectcost infor-
mation. Let the originalinitialcost be simply C o.
To increase the strength of the mast from 8300 to
30,700 in.-Ibcostapproximately 0.025C o. The redesign
which increued the strengthofthe mast to 48,500 in.-Ib
cost approximately 0.02Co. These data points are
plottedin Fig. 29 (normalizedby Co).
The cost of failurewas also estimated. A scenario
was createdwhich would yielda conservativecost esti-
mate for the failureinvolved. Because singlelongeron
buckling was used u the failurepoint, which isnot a
catastrophic failure,a catastrophic scenario was not
created. The scenario developed, therefore,assumed
singlelongeron buckling. If this longeron buckled it
would be likelythat an elbow or corner fittingwould
alsofail.Ifthisoccurred,array retractionmight not be
possible. Since the photovoltaic arrays are to be re-
placed periodically, when their solar cells wear out, part
of the replacement process consists of retracting the old
arrays, and returning them to Earth in the space shut-
tle. There would be a cost associated with a compli-
cated array retrieval. An estimate for this cost is 2.5Co,
although this cost is not based upon C O. The probabil-
ity of failure of each array was multiplied by the cost of
failure to identify the expected cost of failure. A plot of
these values is shown in Fig. 29 {normalised by Co).
Finally, these sets of values were added together to com-
pute total normalized cost using Eq. (4), and were also
plotted in Fig. 29. Assuming that total cost minimiza-
tion is the design criteria, then based upon the approxi-
mate data used, the 30,700 in.-lb array would appear to
be the optimal design.
Suggested Developments
This study is a demonstration of structural reliability
techniques to a unique application. However, the
simplifying assumptions made prohibit the results from
being utilised as more than information. In order to
make these techniques more useful, several changes are
suggested. These include considering dynamic transient
analysis, considering variance reduction techniques,
using better algorithms, and considering other failure
modes.
In order to progress from this initial study to a more
realistic and acceptable reliability assessment, actual
dynamic analysis needs to be performed. There are two
constraints to employing Monte Carlo simulation to do
this. First, dynamic analysis requires so much computa-
tion that the resources most likely would not be avail-
able to run the required number of simulations to
properly define the load distribution. Secondly, shuttle
simulations are difficult to develop so that, at best, a
few hundred simulated approaches to Space Station
Freedom would be available.
The above limitations would place so much uncer-
tainty on the Monte Carlo simulation results that they
would not be useful. However, in recent years variance
reduction techniques have been developed to make the
Monte Carlo process converge more quickly to the true
probability of failure. One of these methods is known as
importance sampling. Importance sampling involves
modifying Eq. (I) such that g(x) is less than zero more
often than would naturally occur based on Pf. This is
done by sampling x more frequently near the critical
values. The probability of failure can then be written
8_q,
Pf = fI[g(x)]f(x)p(x)/p(x) dx
(_ g,)* f(x}/[p(x) * N]
(7)
where p(x) is a probability density function centered
around the failure point. This method can reduce the
number of simulations required by several orders of
magnitude over direct Monte Carlo. 15
As additional design information about the photo-
voltaic array becomes available, the additional higher
failure modes such as batten collapse should be consid-
ered. It is possible to represent these higher modes as a
series system, with no correlation with longeron buckling
failure modes. This would require a series of indepen-
dent analyses. Consideration of catastrophic system fail-
ure, which would be a combination of different failure
modes, would be much more complicated than consider-
ing higher buckling modes. This analysis would no
longer be a series of independent analyses. 1° Both the
probability of failure and system reliability analyses
would need to be revised. Finally, as statistical informa-
tion about the mast component fabricating becomes
available, it should be included in formulating the
strength distribution of the mast.
Limitations in the Rackwitz-Fiessler algorithm have
been discussed. Any future work should utilize a f'wst
order-second moment algorithm with improved accuracy
in the tail regions.
Conclusions
A methodology has been presented for examining
internal loads on a structure when the applied forces are
dependent on many random variables. It is applicable
when the dependence of the loading on these random
variables is not easily defined. This method places, as
is standard in structural reliability analysis, the question
of internal loads in terms of a probability of failure
rather than a limit load exceedance. This methodology
has been successfully applied to plume impingement
loading from the space shuttle jets on the Space Station
Freedom Photovoltaic Array. This method is also suit-
able to plume impingement loading on other components
of the Space Station Freedom, as well as other large
space structures subject to shuttle approaches. This
probability based approach has been shown to be viable
and could be developed as a more appropriate alterna-
tive to deterministic analysis of plume impingement.
Using the many conservative assumptions discussed
in the paper, it was shown that the probability of failure
of the Space Station Freedom Photovoltaic Array mast
in bending due to plume impingement is very low. A
large caveat must be issued. The design, operations,
and specifications of the Space Station Freedom are still
evolving. Changes in these items can have a large
impact on the validity of the previous conclusion. Two
previous array mast designs were also examined. The
original design of the array mast had a high probability
of failure, and an intermediate design had a low proba-
bility of failure.
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TABLE 1.--PARAMETERS FOR PHOTOVOLTAIC
ARRAY LOAD DISTRIBUTIONS
Distribution
PIU nominal
PIL nominal
PIU breakout
PIL breakout
Type Mean, Coefficient of
in.-lb variation,
percent
Normal 5400 61.1
Normal 3400 60.3
Log-normal 4041 29.8
Log-normal 6216 29.7
TABLE 2.--PHOTOVOLTAIC ARRAY MAST
STRENGTH PROPERTIES
Mast design
limit load_
in.-lb
8 300
30 700
48 500
Type Mean, Coefficient of
in.-lb variation,
percent
Log-normal 13 750 16.4
Log-normal 50 655 16.4
Log-normal 91 263 20.6
TABLE 3.mDETAILED PROBABILITY DATA OF BOTTOM LONGERON,
Variable
Mut strength
Nominal dynamic load
Breakout dynamic load
Plume uncertainty factor
Model uncertainty factor
Safety index_ _ = 5.455
30,700 in.-Ib PIL ARRAY
Mean Coefficient of Design a,
variation, point sensitivity
percent
50,655 16.4 31,007 0.5389
3,400 60.3 6,452 -.2729
6,216 29.7 18,492 -.7144
1.0 10.0 1.157 -.2869
1.0 6.7 1.075 -.2056
Probability of failure, Pf = 2.4600x 10 -s
TABLE 4.--DETAILED PROBABILITY DATA OF BOTTOM LONGERON,
Variable
Mast strength
Nominal dynamic load
Breakout dynamic load
Plume uncertainty factor
Model uncertainty factor
. SMet _ !mdex,fl =._.5.461
30,700 in.-lb PIU ARRAY
Mean Coefficient of
variation,
percent
50,655 16.4
5,400 61.1
4,041 29.8
1.0 10.0
1.0 6.7
Probability of failure, Pf = 2.3743x10 -s
Design a,
point sensitivity
28,593 0.6295
15,728 -.5731
6,584 -.3326
1.179 -.3286
1.087 - .2378
TABLE 5.--PROBABILITY OF FAILURE SUMMARY FOR THREE
MAST CAPABILITIES
Mast design
limit load,
in.-Ib
8,300
30,700
48,500
P f,
upper array
0.567
4.64xi0 -s
Z86×I0 -t2
Pf_
lower array
0.467
2.37x10 -s
8.84xi0 -t2
Pf_
either array
0.769
1.00)< I0-s
l.ITx10 -tl
Pf_
lifetime
1.00
1.20×10 -s
1.40x10 -t
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Figure 1 .--Permane_ntly manned configuration (PMC) of the space station with feathered photovoltaic arrays. Port alpha = --44 _,
PIU beta = -22 °, PIL beta = -48 °.
Extendable
mast
. _ _ Top blanket boxes
t-- Blanket
129O
In, 1400
in.
Bottom
blanket
boxes _ ,.. ,_
Canister __._.- T- -_ ....
/ _--- Base of mast
Beta joint _1
Figure 2,--Space Station Freedom photovoltaic array.
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Figure 3._Frequency of occurrence of distance away from
the space station when the jets were fired during the
Monte Carlo simulations of the nominal approach.
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Figure 4.--Freq_ncy of occurrence of distance away from
the space station when the jets were fired during the
Monte Carlo simulations of the breakout maneuver.
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Figure 5.--DistdbuUon of radial offset from the centedlne
of the cone of approach when Jets were fired in the
Monte Carlo simulations. Distribution Is designed as
uniform inside of ± 10 ° and decreasing Ilnearty to zero
at 12.2 °.
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Figure 6.--Frequency of occurrence of shuttle rotation
about X, Y, and Z axes when Jets were fired In the
Monte Carlo simulations. Distribution is designed as
normal with a mean = 0, (7 = 1.0 °.
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Figure 7.--Frequency of occurrence of space station rota-
tion about X, Y, and Z axes when Jets were fired in the
Monte Carlo simulations. Distribution is designed as
normal with a mean = 0, _r ,, 1.0 °.
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Figure 8.---Frequency of occuwence of thermal twist
deformatiomi about X, Y, and Z axes when jets were
fired in the Monte Carlo simulations. [:)Istdbution is
designed as normal with a mean = 0, cr = 1.67 °.
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Figure 9.--Frequency of occurrence of mast design twist
when Jets were fired In the Monte Carlo simulations.
Distribution Is designed as normal with a mean = O,
(_ = 1.0 °.
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Figure 10.--Distribution of the uncertainty factor on the
plume impingement force prediction used in the limit
state function. Normal distribution with mean = 1.0,
_ =0.1.
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Figure 11 .--Frequency of occurrence of port alpha joint
angles selected when Jets were fired during the Monte
Cado simulations. Distdbutlon is designed as normal
distribution with mean = -44 °, _ = 1.333 °.
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Figure 12.--Frequency of occurrence of port inboard
upper photovoltalc array beta Joint angles selected when
Jets were fired during the Monte Carlo simulations. Dis-
tdbution is designed as normal with a mean = -22 °,
= 1.0 °.
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Rgure 13.--Frequency of occurrence of port Inboard
lower photovoltalc array beta joint angles selected when
Jets were fired during the Monte Carlo simulations. Dis-
tdbutlon is designed as normal with a mean = -48 °,
cx = 1.0 °.
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Figure 14._Frequency of occurrence of dynamic load
factor on the pod inboard upper photovoltalc array due
to Y-bum fldngs dudng a nominal approach. Distri-
bution is designed as normal with a mean = 0.6, _ = 0.05.
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Figure 15.--Frequency of occurrence of dynamic load
factor on the port Inboard lower photovoltalc array due
to Z-braking fldngs during • nominal approach. Distd-
bution Is designed as normal with a mean = 0.1, _ = 0.05.
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Figure 18.---Frequency of occurretce of Wnamlc load
lictor on the port inbcxlrd lower photovoltaic _ due
to Y-bum firings dudng a nornklsl approech. Dlstrit)utlon
is designed as normal with a mean ,, 0.35, cr,, 0.05.
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Figure 17.---Frequency of occurrence of dynamic load factor on
the pod inboard upper photovoltaic array due to a Norm Z
breakout. Distribution Is designed as normal with a
mean = 1.3, o = 0.05.
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Figure 18.uFrequency of occurrence of dynamic load factor on
the port inboard Iowar photovoltalc array due to a Norm Z
breakout. Distribution Is designed as normal with a
mean = 2.0, o = 0.05.
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Figure 1 g.--Distdbutlon of model (dynamics) uncer-
tainty factor used in the Monte Carlo simulations.
Normal dlstdbuUons with a mean = 1.0, o = 0.0667.
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Figure 20.--Photovoltaic array deployable mast.
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Figure 21 .wDetails of deployable mast.
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Figure 23.--Top view of deployable mast.
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Figure 24..--DIstribution of nominal approach bending moment
on the port Inboard upper photovoltalc array. The data points
represent the results of the Monte Cado simulations. The
curve Is the normal distribution used as a model for the data.
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Figure 25.reDistribution of nominal approach bending moment
on the port Inboard lower photovoltaic array. The data points
represent the results of the Monte Carlo simulations. The
curve is the normal distribution used as a model for the data.
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ment on the port Inboard upper photovoltalc array. The
data points represent the results of the Monte Carlo simu-
lations. The curve is the log-normal distribution used as a
model for the data.
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